delivered 20 April 1964 at the opening of his defense in the 1964 trial

I am the First Accused. 

I hold a Bachelor's Degree in Arts and practised as an attorney in Johannesburg for a  number of years in partnership with Oliver Tambo. I am a convicted prisoner serving  five years for leaving the country without a permit and for inciting people to go on  strike at the end of May 1961. 

At the outset, I want to say that the suggestion made by the State in its opening  that the struggle in South Africa is under the influence of foreigners or communists is  wholly incorrect. I have done whatever I did, both as an individual and as a leader of my people, because of my experience in South Africa and my own proudly felt African background, and not because of what any outsider might have said. 

In my youth in the Transkei I listened to the elders of my tribe telling stories of the  old days. Amongst the tales they related to me were those of wars fought by our  ancestors in defence of the fatherland. The names of Dingane and Bambata, Hintsa  and Makana, Squngthi and Dalasile, Moshoeshoe and Sekhukhuni, were praised as  the glory of the entire African nation. I hoped then that life might offer me the  opportunity to serve my people and make my own humble contribution to their  freedom struggle. This is what has motivated me in all that I have done in relation to  the charges made against me in this case. 

Having said this, I must deal immediately and at some length with the question of  violence. Some of the things so far told to the Court are true and some are untrue. I  do not, however, deny that I planned sabotage. I did not plan it in a spirit of  recklessness, nor because I have any love of violence. I planned it as a result of a  calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years  of tyranny, exploitation, and oppression of my people by the Whites. 

I admit immediately that I was one of the persons who helped to form Umkhonto we  Sizwe, and that I played a prominent role in its affairs until I was arrested in August  1962. 

In the statement which I am about to make I shall correct certain false impressions  which have been created by State witnesses. Amongst other things, I will  demonstrate that certain of the acts referred to in the evidence were not and could  not have been committed by Umkhonto. I will also deal with the relationship between  the African National Congress and Umkhonto, and with the part which I personally  have played in the affairs of both organizations. I shall deal also with the part played  by the Communist Party. In order to explain these matters properly, I will have to  explain what Umkhonto set out to achieve; what methods it prescribed for the  achievement of these objects, and why these methods were chosen. I will also have  to explain how I became involved in the activities of these organizations.

I deny that Umkhonto was responsible for a number of acts which clearly fell outside  the policy of the organization, and which have been charged in the indictment  against us. I do not know what justification there was for these acts, but to  demonstrate that they could not have been authorized by Umkhonto, I want to refer  briefly to the roots and policy of the organization. 

I have already mentioned that I was one of the persons who helped to form  Umkhonto. I, and the others who started the organization, did so for two reasons. 

Firstly, we believed that as a result of Government policy, violence by the African  people had become inevitable, and that unless responsible leadership was given to  canalize and control the feelings of our people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism  which would produce an intensity of bitterness and hostility between the various  races of this country which is not produced even by war.

Secondly, we felt that  without violence there would be no way open to the African people to succeed in  their struggle against the principle of white supremacy. All lawful modes of  expressing opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation, and we were  placed in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority,  or to defy the Government. We chose to defy the law. We first broke the law in a  way which avoided any recourse to violence; when this form was legislated against,  and then the Government resorted to a show of force to crush opposition to its  policies, only then did we decide to answer violence with violence. 

But the violence which we chose to adopt was not terrorism. We who formed  Umkhonto were all members of the African National Congress, and had behind us the  ANC tradition of non-violence and negotiation as a means of solving political  disputes. We believe that South Africa belongs to all the people who live in it, and  not to one group, be it black or white. We did not want an interracial war, and tried  to avoid it to the last minute. If the Court is in doubt about this, it will be seen that  the whole history of our organization bears out what I have said, and what I will  subsequently say, when I describe the tactics which Umkhonto decided to adopt. I  want, therefore, to say something about the African National Congress. 

The African National Congress was formed in 1912 to defend the rights of the African  people which had been seriously curtailed by the South Africa Act, and which were  then being threatened by the Native Land Act. For thirty-seven years - that is until  1949 - it adhered strictly to a constitutional struggle. It put forward demands and  resolutions; it sent delegations to the Government in the belief that African  grievances could be settled through peaceful discussion and that Africans could  advance gradually to full political rights. But White Governments remained unmoved,  and the rights of Africans became less instead of becoming greater. In the words of  my leader, Chief Lutuli, who became President of the ANC in 1952, and who was  later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize: 

"Who will deny that thirty years of my life have been spent knocking in vain,  patiently, moderately, and modestly at a closed and barred door? What have been  the fruits of moderation? The past thirty years have seen the greatest number of  laws restricting our rights and progress, until today we have reached a stage where  we have almost no rights at all." 

Even after 1949, the ANC remained determined to avoid violence. At this time,  however, there was a change from the strictly constitutional means of protest which  had been employed in the past. The change was embodied in a decision which was taken to protest against apartheid legislation by peaceful, but unlawful,  demonstrations against certain laws. Pursuant to this policy the ANC launched the  Defiance Campaign, in which I was placed in charge of volunteers. This campaign  was based on the principles of passive resistance. More than 8,500 people defied  apartheid laws and went to jail. Yet there was not a single instance of violence in the  course of this campaign on the part of any defier. I and nineteen colleagues were  convicted for the role which we played in organizing the campaign, but our sentences  were suspended mainly because the Judge found that discipline and non-violence  had been stressed throughout. This was the time when the volunteer section of the  ANC was established, and when the word 'Amadelakufa' was first used: this was the  time when the volunteers were asked to take a pledge to uphold certain principles.  Evidence dealing with volunteers and their pledges has been introduced into this  case, but completely out of context. The volunteers were not, and are not, the  soldiers of a black army pledged to fight a civil war against the whites. They were,  and are, dedicated workers who are prepared to lead campaigns initiated by the ANC  to distribute leaflets, to organize strikes, or do whatever the particular campaign  required. They are called volunteers because they volunteer to face the penalties of  imprisonment and whipping which are now prescribed by the legislature for such  acts. 

During the Defiance Campaign, the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Law  Amendment Act were passed. These Statutes provided harsher penalties for offences  committed by way of protests against laws. Despite this, the protests continued and  the ANC adhered to its policy of non-violence. In 1956, 156 leading members of the  Congress Alliance, including myself, were arrested on a charge of high treason and  charges under the Suppression of Communism Act. The non-violent policy of the ANC  was put in issue by the State, but when the Court gave judgement some five years  later, it found that the ANC did not have a policy of violence. We were acquitted on  all counts, which included a count that the ANC sought to set up a communist state  in place of the existing regime. The Government has always sought to label all its  opponents as communists. This allegation has been repeated in the present case, but  as I will show, the ANC is not, and never has been, a communist organization. 

In 1960 there was the shooting at Sharpeville, which resulted in the proclamation of  a state of emergency and the declaration of the ANC as an unlawful organization. My  colleagues and I, after careful consideration, decided that we would not obey this  decree. The African people were not part of the Government and did not make the  laws by which they were governed. We believed in the words of the Universal  Declaration of Human Rights, that 'the will of the people shall be the basis of  authority of the Government,' and for us to accept the banning was equivalent to  accepting the silencing of the Africans for all time. The ANC refused to dissolve, but  instead went underground. We believed it was our duty to preserve this organization  which had been built up with almost fifty years of unremitting toil. I have no doubt  that no self-respecting White political organization would disband itself if declared  illegal by a government in which it had no say. 

In 1960 the Government held a referendum which led to the establishment of the  Republic. Africans, who constituted approximately 70 per cent of the population of  South Africa, were not entitled to vote, and were not even consulted about the  proposed constitutional change. All of us were apprehensive of our future under the  proposed White Republic, and a resolution was taken to hold an All-In African  Conference to call for a National Convention, and to organize mass demonstrations on the eve of the unwanted Republic, if the Government failed to call the Convention.  The conference was attended by Africans of various political persuasions. I was the  Secretary of the conference and undertook to be responsible for organizing the  national stay-at-home which was subsequently called to coincide with the declaration  of the Republic. As all strikes by Africans are illegal, the person organizing such a  strike must avoid arrest. I was chosen to be this person, and consequently I had to  leave my home and family and my practice and go into hiding to avoid arrest. 

The stay-at-home, in accordance with ANC policy, was to be a peaceful  demonstration. Careful instructions were given to organizers and members to avoid  any recourse to violence. The Government's answer was to introduce new and  harsher laws, to mobilize its armed forces, and to send Saracens, armed vehicles,  and soldiers into the townships in a massive show of force designed to intimidate the  people. This was an indication that the Government had decided to rule by force  alone, and this decision was a milestone on the road to Umkhonto. 

Some of this may appear irrelevant to this trial. In fact, I believe none of it is  irrelevant because it will, I hope, enable the Court to appreciate the attitude  eventually adopted by the various persons and bodies concerned in the National  Liberation Movement. When I went to jail in 1962, the dominant idea was that loss of  life should be avoided. I now know that this was still so in 1963. 

I must return to June 1961. What were we, the leaders of our people, to do? Were we to give in to the show of force and the implied threat against future action, or  were we to fight it and, if so, how? 

We had no doubt that we had to continue the fight. Anything else would have been  abject surrender. Our problem was not whether to fight, but was how to continue the  fight. We of the ANC had always stood for a non-racial democracy, and we shrank  from any action which might drive the races further apart than they already were.  But the hard facts were that fifty years of non-violence had brought the African  people nothing but more and more repressive legislation, and fewer and fewer rights.  It may not be easy for this Court to understand, but it is a fact that for a long time  the people had been talking of violence - of the day when they would fight the White  man and win back their country - and we, the leaders of the ANC, had nevertheless  always prevailed upon them to avoid violence and to pursue peaceful methods. When  some of us discussed this in May and June of 1961, it could not be denied that our  policy to achieve a non-racial State by non-violence had achieved nothing, and that  our followers were beginning to lose confidence in this policy and were developing  disturbing ideas of terrorism. 

It must not be forgotten that by this time violence had, in fact, become a feature of  the South African political scene. There had been violence in 1957 when the women  of Zeerust were ordered to carry passes; there was violence in 1958 with the  enforcement of cattle culling in Sekhukhuniland; there was violence in 1959 when  the people of Cato Manor protested against pass raids; there was violence in 1960  when the Government attempted to impose Bantu Authorities in Pondoland. Thirty nine Africans died in these disturbances. In 1961 there had been riots in Warmbaths,  and all this time the Transkei had been a seething mass of unrest. Each disturbance  pointed clearly to the inevitable growth among Africans of the belief that violence  was the only way out - it showed that a Government which uses force to maintain its  rule teaches the oppressed to use force to oppose it. Already small groups had arisen in the urban areas and were spontaneously making plans for violent forms of political  struggle. There now arose a danger that these groups would adopt terrorism against  Africans, as well as Whites, if not properly directed. Particularly disturbing was the  type of violence engendered in places such as Zeerust, Sekhukhuniland, and  Pondoland amongst Africans. It was increasingly taking the form, not of struggle  against the Government - though this is what prompted it - but of civil strife  amongst themselves, conducted in such a way that it could not hope to achieve  anything other than a loss of life and bitterness. 

At the beginning of June 1961, after a long and anxious assessment of the South  African situation, I, and some colleagues, came to the conclusion that as violence in  this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to  continue preaching peace and non-violence at a time when the Government met our  peaceful demands with force. 

This conclusion was not easily arrived at. It was only when all else had failed, when  all channels of peaceful protest had been barred to us, that the decision was made to  embark on violent forms of political struggle, and to form Umkhonto we Sizwe. We  did so not because we desired such a course, but solely because the Government  had left us with no other choice. In the Manifesto of Umkhonto published on 16  December 1961, which is Exhibit AD, we said: 

"The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices - submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we  have no choice but to hit back by all means in our power in defence of our people,  our future, and our freedom." 

This was our feeling in June of 1961 when we decided to press for a change in the  policy of the National Liberation Movement. I can only say that I felt morally obliged  to do what I did. 

We who had taken this decision started to consult leaders of various organizations,  including the ANC. I will not say whom we spoke to, or what they said, but I wish to  deal with the role of the African National Congress in this phase of the struggle, and  with the policy and objectives of Umkhonto we Sizwe. 

As far as the ANC was concerned, it formed a clear view which can be summarized  as follows: 

• It was a mass political organization with a political function to fulfil. Its  members had joined on the express policy of non-violence. 

• Because of all this, it could not and would not undertake violence. This  must be stressed. One cannot turn such a body into the small, closely  knit organization required for sabotage. Nor would this be politically  correct, because it would result in members ceasing to carry out this  essential activity: political propaganda and organization. Nor was it  permissible to change the whole nature of the organization. 

• On the other hand, in view of this situation I have described, the ANC  was prepared to depart from its fifty-year-old policy of non-violence to  this extent that it would no longer disapprove of properly controlled violence. Hence members who undertook such activity would not be  subject to disciplinary action by the ANC. 

I say 'properly controlled violence' because I made it clear that if I formed the  organization I would at all times subject it to the political guidance of the ANC and  would not undertake any different form of activity from that contemplated without  the consent of the ANC. And I shall now tell the Court how that form of violence  came to be determined. 

As a result of this decision, Umkhonto was formed in November 1961. When we took  this decision, and subsequently formulated our plans, the ANC heritage of non violence and racial harmony was very much with us. We felt that the country was  drifting towards a civil war in which Blacks and Whites would fight each other. We  viewed the situation with alarm. Civil war could mean the destruction of what the  ANC stood for; with civil war, racial peace would be more difficult than ever to  achieve. We already have examples in South African history of the results of war. It  has taken more than fifty years for the scars of the South African War to disappear.  How much longer would it take to eradicate the scars of inter-racial civil war, which  could not be fought without a great loss of life on both sides? 

The avoidance of civil war had dominated our thinking for many years, but when we  decided to adopt violence as part of our policy, we realized that we might one day  have to face the prospect of such a war. This had to be taken into account in  formulating our plans. We required a plan which was flexible and which permitted us  to act in accordance with the needs of the times; above all, the plan had to be one  which recognized civil war as the last resort, and left the decision on this question to  the future. We did not want to be committed to civil war, but we wanted to be ready  if it became inevitable. 

Four forms of violence were possible. There is sabotage, there is guerrilla warfare,  there is terrorism, and there is open revolution. We chose to adopt the first method  and to exhaust it before taking any other decision. 

In the light of our political background the choice was a logical one. Sabotage did not  involve loss of life, and it offered the best hope for future race relations. Bitterness  would be kept to a minimum and, if the policy bore fruit, democratic government could become a reality. This is what we felt at the time, and this is what we said in  our Manifesto (Exhibit AD): 

"We of Umkhonto we Sizwe have always sought to achieve liberation without  bloodshed and civil clash. We hope, even at this late hour, that our first actions will  awaken everyone to a realization of the disastrous situation to which the Nationalist  policy is leading. We hope that we will bring the Government and its supporters to  their senses before it is too late, so that both the Government and its policies can be  changed before matters reach the desperate state of civil war." 

The initial plan was based on a careful analysis of the political and economic situation  of our country. We believed that South Africa depended to a large extent on foreign  capital and foreign trade. We felt that planned destruction of power plants, and  interference with rail and telephone communications, would tend to scare away  capital from the country, make it more difficult for goods from the industrial areas to reach the seaports on schedule, and would in the long run be a heavy drain on the  economic life of the country, thus compelling the voters of the country to reconsider  their position. 

Attacks on the economic life-lines of the country were to be linked with sabotage on  Government buildings and other symbols of apartheid. These attacks would serve as  a source of inspiration to our people. In addition, they would provide an outlet for  those people who were urging the adoption of violent methods and would enable us  to give concrete proof to our followers that we had adopted a stronger line and were  fighting back against Government violence. 

In addition, if mass action were successfully organized, and mass reprisals taken, we  felt that sympathy for our cause would be roused in other countries, and that greater  pressure would be brought to bear on the South African Government. 

This then was the plan. Umkhonto was to perform sabotage, and strict instructions  were given to its members right from the start, that on no account were they to  injure or kill people in planning or carrying out operations. These instructions have  been referred to in the evidence of 'Mr. X' and 'Mr. Z.' 

The affairs of the Umkhonto were controlled and directed by a National High  Command, which had powers of co-option and which could, and did, appoint  Regional Commands. The High Command was the body which determined tactics and  targets and was in charge of training and finance. Under the High Command there  were Regional Commands which were responsible for the direction of the local  sabotage groups. Within the framework of the policy laid down by the National High  Command, the Regional Commands had authority to select the targets to be  attacked. They had no authority to go beyond the prescribed framework and thus  had no authority to embark upon acts which endangered life, or which did not fit into  the overall plan of sabotage. For instance, Umkhonto members were forbidden ever  to go armed into operation. Incidentally, the terms High Command and Regional  Command were an importation from the Jewish national underground organization  Irgun Zvai Leumi, which operated in Israel between 1944 and 1948. 

Umkhonto had its first operation on 16 December 1961, when Government buildings  in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban were attacked. The selection of targets  is proof of the policy to which I have referred. Had we intended to attack life we  would have selected targets where people congregated and not empty buildings and  power stations. The sabotage which was committed before 16 December 1961 was  the work of isolated groups and had no connection whatever with Umkhonto. In fact,  some of these and a number of later acts were claimed by other organizations. 

The Manifesto of Umkhonto was issued on the day that operations commenced. The  response to our actions and Manifesto among the white population was  characteristically violent. The Government threatened to take strong action, and  called upon its supporters to stand firm and to ignore the demands of the Africans.  The Whites failed to respond by suggesting change; they responded to our call by  suggesting the laager. 

In contrast, the response of the Africans was one of encouragement. Suddenly there  was hope again. Things were happening. People in the townships became eager for political news. A great deal of enthusiasm was generated by the initial successes,  and people began to speculate on how soon freedom would be obtained. 

But we in Umkhonto weighed up the white response with anxiety. The lines were  being drawn. The whites and blacks were moving into separate camps, and the  prospects of avoiding a civil war were made less. The white newspapers carried  reports that sabotage would be punished by death. If this was so, how could we  continue to keep Africans away from terrorism? 

Already scores of Africans had died as a result of racial friction. In 1920 when the  famous leader, Masabala, was held in Port Elizabeth jail, twenty-four of a group of  Africans who had gathered to demand his release were killed by the police and white  civilians. In 1921 more than one hundred Africans died in the Bulhoek affair. In 1924  over two hundred Africans were killed when the Administrator of South-West Africa  led a force against a group which had rebelled against the imposition of dog tax. On  1 May 1950, eighteen Africans died as a result of police shootings during the strike.  On 21 March 1960, sixty-nine unarmed Africans died at Sharpeville. 

How many more Sharpevilles would there be in the history of our country? And how  many more Sharpevilles could the country stand without violence and terror  becoming the order of the day? And what would happen to our people when that  stage was reached? In the long run we felt certain we must succeed, but at what  cost to ourselves and the rest of the country? And if this happened, how could black  and white ever live together again in peace and harmony? These were the problems  that faced us, and these were our decisions. 

Experience convinced us that rebellion would offer the Government limitless  opportunities for the indiscriminate slaughter of our people. But it was precisely  because the soil of South Africa is already drenched with the blood of innocent  Africans that we felt it our duty to make preparations as a long-term undertaking to  use force in order to defend ourselves against force. If war were inevitable, we  wanted the fight to be conducted on terms most favorable to our people. The fight  which held out prospects best for us and the least risk of life to both sides was  guerrilla warfare. We decided, therefore, in our preparations for the future, to make  provision for the possibility of guerrilla warfare. 

All whites undergo compulsory military training, but no such training was given to  Africans. It was in our view essential to build up a nucleus of trained men who would  be able to provide the leadership which would be required if guerrilla warfare started. We had to prepare for such a situation before it became too late to make proper  preparations. It was also necessary to build up a nucleus of men trained in civil  administration and other professions, so that Africans would be equipped to  participate in the government of this country as soon as they were allowed to do so. 

At this stage it was decided that I should attend the Conference of the Pan-African  Freedom Movement for Central, East, and Southern Africa, which was to be held  early in 1962 in Addis Ababa, and, because of our need for preparation, it was also  decided that, after the conference, I would undertake a tour of the African States  with a view to obtaining facilities for the training of soldiers, and that I would also  solicit scholarships for the higher education of matriculated Africans. Training in both  fields would be necessary, even if changes came about by peaceful means.  Administrators would be necessary who would be willing and able to administer a non-racial State and so would men be necessary to control the army and police force  of such a State. 

It was on this note that I left South Africa to proceed to Addis Ababa as a delegate of  the ANC. My tour was a success. Wherever I went I met sympathy for our cause and  promises of help. All Africa was united against the stand of White South Africa, and  even in London I was received with great sympathy by political leaders, such as Mr.  Gaitskell and Mr. Grimond. In Africa I was promised support by such men as Julius  Nyerere, now President of Tanganyika; Mr. Kawawa, then Prime Minister of  Tanganyika; Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia; General Abboud, President of the  Sudan; Habib Bourguiba, President of Tunisia; Ben Bella, now President of Algeria;  Modibo Keita, President of Mali; Leopold Senghor, President of Senegal; Sekou  Toure, President of Guinea; President Tubman of Liberia; and Milton Obote, Prime  Minister of Uganda. It was Ben Bella who invited me to visit Oujda, the Headquarters  of the Algerian Army of National Liberation, the visit which is described in my diary,  one of the Exhibits. 

I started to make a study of the art of war and revolution and, whilst abroad,  underwent a course in military training. If there was to be guerrilla warfare, I wanted  to be able to stand and fight with my people and to share the hazards of war with  them. Notes of lectures which I received in Algeria are contained in Exhibit 16,  produced in evidence. Summaries of books on guerrilla warfare and military strategy  have also been produced. I have already admitted that these documents are in my  writing, and I acknowledge that I made these studies to equip myself for the role  which I might have to play if the struggle drifted into guerrilla warfare. I approached  this question as every African Nationalist should do. I was completely objective. The  Court will see that I attempted to examine all types of authority on the subject - from the East and from the West, going back to the classic work of Clausewitz, and  covering such a variety as Mao Tse Tung and Che Guevara on the one hand, and the  writings on the Anglo-Boer War on the other. Of course, these notes are merely  summaries of the books I read and do not contain my personal views. 

I also made arrangements for our recruits to undergo military training. But here it  was impossible to organize any scheme without the co-operation of the ANC offices  in Africa. I consequently obtained the permission of the ANC in South Africa to do  this. To this extent then there was a departure from the original decision of the ANC,  but it applied outside South Africa only. The first batch of recruits actually arrived in  Tanganyika when I was passing through that country on my way back to South  Africa. 

I returned to South Africa and reported to my colleagues on the results of my trip.  On my return I found that there had been little alteration in the political scene save  that the threat of a death penalty for sabotage had now become a fact. The attitude  of my colleagues in Umkhonto was much the same as it had been before I left. They  were feeling their way cautiously and felt that it would be a long time before the  possibilities of sabotage were exhausted. In fact, the view was expressed by some  that the training of recruits was premature. This is recorded by me in the document  which is Exhibit R.14. After a full discussion, however, it was decided to go ahead  with the plans for military training because of the fact that it would take many years  to build up a sufficient nucleus of trained soldiers to start a guerrilla campaign, and  whatever happened, the training would be of value.I wish to turn now to certain general allegations made in this case by the State. But  before doing so, I wish to revert to certain occurrences said by witnesses to have  happened in Port Elizabeth and East London. I am referring to the bombing of private  houses of pro-Government persons during September, October and November 1962.  I do not know what justification there was for these acts, nor what provocation had  been given. But if what I have said already is accepted, then it is clear that these  acts had nothing to do with the carrying out of the policy of Umkhonto. 

One of the chief allegations in the indictment is that the ANC was a party to a  general conspiracy to commit sabotage. I have already explained why this is  incorrect but how, externally, there was a departure from the original principle laid  down by the ANC. There has, of course, been overlapping of functions internally as  well, because there is a difference between a resolution adopted in the atmosphere  of a committee room and the concrete difficulties that arise in the field of practical  activity. At a later stage the position was further affected by bannings and house  arrests, and by persons leaving the country to take up political work abroad. This led  to individuals having to do work in different capacities. But though this may have  blurred the distinction between Umkhonto and the ANC, it by no means abolished  that distinction. Great care was taken to keep the activities of the two organizations  in South Africa distinct. The ANC remained a mass political body of Africans only  carrying on the type of political work they had conducted prior to 1961. Umkhonto  remained a small organization recruiting its members from different races and  organizations and trying to achieve its own particular object. The fact that members  of Umkhonto were recruited from the ANC, and the fact that persons served both  organizations, like Solomon Mbanjwa, did not, in our view, change the nature of the  ANC or give it a policy of violence. This overlapping of officers, however, was more  the exception than the rule. This is why persons such as 'Mr. X' and 'Mr. Z,' who  were on the Regional Command of their respective areas, did not participate in any  of the ANC committees or activities, and why people such as Mr. Bennett Mashiyana  and Mr. Reginald Ndubi did not hear of sabotage at their ANC meetings. 

Another of the allegations in the indictment is that Rivonia was the headquarters of  Umkhonto. This is not true of the time when I was there. I was told, of course, and  knew that certain of the activities of the Communist Party were carried on there. But  this is no reason (as I shall presently explain) why I should not use the place. 

I came there in the following manner: 

• As already indicated, early in April 1961 I went underground to  organize the May general strike. My work entailed travelling  

throughout the country, living now in African townships, then in  

country villages and again in cities.  

• During the second half of the year I started visiting the Parktown  home of Arthur Goldreich, where I used to meet my family privately.  Although I had no direct political association with him, I had known  Arthur Goldreich socially since 1958. 

• In October, Arthur Goldreich informed me that he was moving out of  town and offered me a hiding place there. A few days thereafter, he  arranged for Michael Harmel to take me to Rivonia. I naturally found  Rivonia an ideal place for the man who lived the life of an outlaw. Up  to that time I had been compelled to live indoors during the daytime and could only venture out under cover of darkness. But at Liliesleaf  [farm, Rivonia,] I could live differently and work far more efficiently. • For obvious reasons, I had to disguise myself and I assumed the  fictitious name of David. In December, Arthur Goldreich and his family  moved in. I stayed there until I went abroad on 11 January 1962. As  already indicated, I returned in July 1962 and was arrested in Natal on  5 August. 

• Up to the time of my arrest, Liliesleaf farm was the headquarters of  neither the African National Congress nor Umkhonto. With the  

exception of myself, none of the officials or members of these bodies  lived there, no meetings of the governing bodies were ever held there,  and no activities connected with them were either organized or  

directed from there. On numerous occasions during my stay at  

Liliesleaf farm I met both the Executive Committee of the ANC, as well  as the NHC, but such meetings were held elsewhere and not on the  farm. 

• Whilst staying at Liliesleaf farm, I frequently visited Arthur Goldreich in  the main house and he also paid me visits in my room. We had  

numerous political discussions covering a variety of subjects. We  discussed ideological and practical questions, the Congress Alliance,  Umkhonto and its activities generally, and his experiences as a soldier  in the Palmach, the military wing of the Haganah. Haganah was the  political authority of the Jewish National Movement in Palestine. 

• Because of what I had got to know of Goldreich, I recommended on  my return to South Africa that he should be recruited to Umkhonto. I  do not know of my personal knowledge whether this was done. 

Another of the allegations made by the State is that the aims and objects of the ANC  and the Communist Party are the same. I wish to deal with this and with my own  political position, because I must assume that the State may try to argue from  certain Exhibits that I tried to introduce Marxism into the ANC. The allegation as to  the ANC is false. This is an old allegation which was disproved at the Treason Trial  and which has again reared its head. But since the allegation has been made again, I  shall deal with it as well as with the relationship between the ANC and the  Communist Party and Umkhonto and that party. 

The ideological creed of the ANC is, and always has been, the creed of African  Nationalism. It is not the concept of African Nationalism expressed in the cry, 'Drive  the White man into the sea.' The African Nationalism for which the ANC stands is the  concept of freedom and fulfilment for the African people in their own land. The most  important political document ever adopted by the ANC is the 'Freedom Charter.' It is  by no means a blueprint for a socialist state. It calls for redistribution, but not  nationalization, of land; it provides for nationalization of mines, banks, and monopoly  industry, because big monopolies are owned by one race only, and without such  nationalization racial domination would be perpetuated despite the spread of political  power. It would be a hollow gesture to repeal the Gold Law prohibitions against  Africans when all gold mines are owned by European companies. In this respect the  ANC's policy corresponds with the old policy of the present Nationalist Party which,  for many years, had as part of its programme the nationalization of the gold mines  which, at that time, were controlled by foreign capital. Under the Freedom Charter,  nationalization would take place in an economy based on private enterprise. The  realization of the Freedom Charter would open up fresh fields for a prosperous African population of all classes, including the middle class. The ANC has never at  any period of its history advocated a revolutionary change in the economic structure  of the country, nor has it, to the best of my recollection, ever condemned capitalist  society. 

As far as the Communist Party is concerned, and if I understand its policy correctly,  it stands for the establishment of a State based on the principles of Marxism.  Although it is prepared to work for the Freedom Charter, as a short term solution to  the problems created by white supremacy, it regards the Freedom Charter as the  beginning, and not the end, of its program. 

The ANC, unlike the Communist Party, admitted Africans only as members. Its chief  goal was, and is, for the African people to win unity and full political rights. The  Communist Party's main aim, on the other hand, was to remove the capitalists and  to replace them with a working-class government. The Communist Party sought to  emphasize class distinctions whilst the ANC seeks to harmonize them. This is a vital  distinction. 

It is true that there has often been close co-operation between the ANC and the  Communist Party. But co-operation is merely proof of a common goal - in this case  the removal of white supremacy - and is not proof of a complete community of  interests. 

The history of the world is full of similar examples. Perhaps the most striking  illustration is to be found in the co-operation between Great Britain, the United  States of America, and the Soviet Union in the fight against Hitler. Nobody but Hitler  would have dared to suggest that such co-operation turned Churchill or Roosevelt  into communists or communist tools, or that Britain and America were working to  bring about a communist world. 

Another instance of such co-operation is to be found precisely in Umkhonto. Shortly  after Umkhonto was constituted, I was informed by some of its members that the  Communist Party would support Umkhonto, and this then occurred. At a later stage  the support was made openly. 

I believe that communists have always played an active role in the fight by colonial  countries for their freedom, because the short-term objects of communism would  always correspond with the long-term objects of freedom movements. Thus  communists have played an important role in the freedom struggles fought in  countries such as Malaya, Algeria, and Indonesia, yet none of these States today are  communist countries. Similarly in the underground resistance movements which  sprung up in Europe during the last World War, communists played an important  role. Even General Chiang Kai-Shek, today one of the bitterest enemies of  communism, fought together with the communists against the ruling class in the  struggle which led to his assumption of power in China in the 1930s. 

This pattern of co-operation between communists and non-communists has been  repeated in the National Liberation Movement of South Africa. Prior to the banning of  the Communist Party, joint campaigns involving the Communist Party and the  Congress movements were accepted practice. African communists could, and did,  become members of the ANC, and some served on the National, Provincial, and local committees. Amongst those who served on the National Executive are Albert Nzula,  a former Secretary of the Communist Party, Moses Kotane, another former  Secretary, and J. B. Marks, a former member of the Central Committee. 

I joined the ANC in 1944, and in my younger days I held the view that the policy of  admitting communists to the ANC, and the close co-operation which existed at times  on specific issues between the ANC and the Communist Party, would lead to a  watering down of the concept of African Nationalism. At that stage I was a member  of the African National Congress Youth League, and was one of a group which moved  for the expulsion of communists from the ANC. This proposal was heavily defeated.  Amongst those who voted against the proposal were some of the most conservative  sections of African political opinion. They defended the policy on the ground that  from its inception the ANC was formed and built up, not as a political party with one  school of political thought, but as a Parliament of the African people, accommodating  people of various political convictions, all united by the common goal of national  liberation. I was eventually won over to this point of view and I have upheld it ever  since. 

It is perhaps difficult for white South Africans, with an ingrained prejudice against  communism, to understand why experienced African politicians so readily accept  communists as their friends. But to us the reason is obvious. Theoretical differences  amongst those fighting against oppression is a luxury we cannot afford at this stage.  What is more, for many decades communists were the only political group in South  Africa who were prepared to treat Africans as human beings and their equals; who  were prepared to eat with us; talk with us, live with us, and work with us. They were  the only political group which was prepared to work with the Africans for the  attainment of political rights and a stake in society. Because of this, there are many  Africans who, today, tend to equate freedom with communism. They are supported  in this belief by a legislature which brands all exponents of democratic government  and African freedom as communists and bans many of them (who are not  communists) under the Suppression of Communism Act. Although I have never been  a member of the Communist Party, I myself have been named under that pernicious  Act because of the role I played in the Defiance Campaign. I have also been banned  and imprisoned under that Act. 

It is not only in internal politics that we count communists as amongst those who  support our cause. In the international field, communist countries have always come  to our aid. In the United Nations and other Councils of the world the communist bloc  has supported the Afro-Asian struggle against colonialism and often seems to be  more sympathetic to our plight than some of the Western powers. Although there is  a universal condemnation of apartheid, the communist bloc speaks out against it  with a louder voice than most of the white world. In these circumstances, it would  take a brash young politician, such as I was in 1949, to proclaim that the  Communists are our enemies. 

I turn now to my own position. I have denied that I am a communist, and I think  that in the circumstances I am obliged to state exactly what my political beliefs are. 

I have always regarded myself, in the first place, as an African patriot. After all, I  was born in Umtata, forty-six years ago. My guardian was my cousin, who was the  acting paramount chief of Tembuland, and I am related both to the present paramount chief of Tembuland, Sabata Dalindyebo, and to Kaizer Matanzima, the  Chief Minister of the Transkei. 

Today I am attracted by the idea of a classless society, an attraction which springs in  part from Marxist reading and, in part, from my admiration of the structure and  organization of early African societies in this country. The land, then the main means  of production, belonged to the tribe. There were no rich or poor and there was no  exploitation. 

It is true, as I have already stated, that I have been influenced by Marxist thought.  But this is also true of many of the leaders of the new independent States. Such  widely different persons as Gandhi, Nehru, Nkrumah, and Nasser all acknowledge  this fact. We all accept the need for some form of socialism to enable our people to  catch up with the advanced countries of this world and to overcome their legacy of  extreme poverty. But this does not mean we are Marxists. 

Indeed, for my own part, I believe that it is open to debate whether the Communist  Party has any specific role to play at this particular stage of our political struggle.  The basic task at the present moment is the removal of race discrimination and the  attainment of democratic rights on the basis of the Freedom Charter. In so far as  that Party furthers this task, I welcome its assistance. I realize that it is one of the  means by which people of all races can be drawn into our struggle. 

From my reading of Marxist literature and from conversations with Marxists, I have  gained the impression that communists regard the parliamentary system of the West  as undemocratic and reactionary. But, on the contrary, I am an admirer of such a  system. 

The Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights, and the Bill of Rights are documents which  are held in veneration by democrats throughout the world. 

I have great respect for British political institutions, and for the country's system of  justice. I regard the British Parliament as the most democratic institution in the  world, and the independence and impartiality of its judiciary never fails to arouse my  admiration. 

The American Congress, that country's doctrine of separation of powers, as well as  the independence of its judiciary, arouses in me similar sentiments. 

I have been influenced in my thinking by both West and East. All this has led me to  feel that in my search for a political formula, I should be absolutely impartial and  objective. I should tie myself to no particular system of society other than of  socialism. I must leave myself free to borrow the best from the West and from the  East . . . 

There are certain Exhibits which suggest that we received financial support from  abroad, and I wish to deal with this question. 

Our political struggle has always been financed from internal sources - from funds  raised by our own people and by our own supporters. Whenever we had a special  campaign or an important political case - for example, the Treason Trial - we received financial assistance from sympathetic individuals and organizations in the  Western countries. We had never felt it necessary to go beyond these sources. 

But when in 1961 the Umkhonto was formed, and a new phase of struggle  introduced, we realized that these events would make a heavy call on our slender  resources, and that the scale of our activities would be hampered by the lack of  funds. One of my instructions, as I went abroad in January 1962, was to raise funds  from the African states. 

I must add that, whilst abroad, I had discussions with leaders of political movements  in Africa and discovered that almost every single one of them, in areas which had  still not attained independence, had received all forms of assistance from the  socialist countries, as well as from the West, including that of financial support. I also  discovered that some well-known African states, all of them non-communists, and  even anti-communists, had received similar assistance. 

On my return to the Republic, I made a strong recommendation to the ANC that we  should not confine ourselves to Africa and the Western countries, but that we should  also send a mission to the socialist countries to raise the funds which we so urgently  needed. 

I have been told that after I was convicted such a mission was sent, but I am not  prepared to name any countries to which it went, nor am I at liberty to disclose the  names of the organizations and countries which gave us support or promised to do  so. 

As I understand the State case, and in particular the evidence of 'Mr. X,' the  suggestion is that Umkhonto was the inspiration of the Communist Party which  sought by playing upon imaginary grievances to enroll the African people into an  army which ostensibly was to fight for African freedom, but in reality was fighting for  a communist state. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact the suggestion is  preposterous. Umkhonto was formed by Africans to further their struggle for freedom  in their own land. Communists and others supported the movement, and we only  wish that more sections of the community would join us. 

Our fight is against real, and not imaginary, hardships or, to use the language of the  State Prosecutor, 'so-called hardships.' Basically, we fight against two features which  are the hallmarks of African life in South Africa and which are entrenched by  legislation which we seek to have repealed. These features are poverty and lack of  human dignity, and we do not need communists or so-called 'agitators' to teach us  about these things. 

South Africa is the richest country in Africa, and could be one of the richest countries  in the world. But it is a land of extremes and remarkable contrasts. The whites enjoy  what may well be the highest standard of living in the world, whilst Africans live in  poverty and misery. Forty per cent of the Africans live in hopelessly overcrowded  and, in some cases, drought-stricken Reserves, where soil erosion and the  overworking of the soil makes it impossible for them to live properly off the land.  Thirty per cent are laborers, labor tenants, and squatters on white farms and work  and live under conditions similar to those of the serfs of the Middle Ages. The other  30 per cent live in towns where they have developed economic and social habits which bring them closer in many respects to white standards. Yet most Africans,  even in this group, are impoverished by low incomes and high cost of living. 

The highest-paid and the most prosperous section of urban African life is in  Johannesburg. Yet their actual position is desperate. The latest figures were given on  25 March 1964 by Mr. Carr, Manager of the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs  Department. The poverty datum line for the average African family in Johannesburg  (according to Mr. Carr's department) is R42.84 per month. He showed that the  average monthly wage is R32.24 and that 46 per cent of all African families in  Johannesburg do not earn enough to keep them going. 

Poverty goes hand in hand with malnutrition and disease. The incidence of  malnutrition and deficiency diseases is very high amongst Africans. Tuberculosis,  pellagra, kwashiorkor, gastro-enteritis, and scurvy bring death and destruction of  health. The incidence of infant mortality is one of the highest in the world. According  to the Medical Officer of Health for Pretoria, tuberculosis kills forty people a day  (almost all Africans), and in 1961 there were 58,491 new cases reported. These  diseases not only destroy the vital organs of the body, but they result in retarded  mental conditions and lack of initiative, and reduce powers of concentration. The  secondary results of such conditions affect the whole community and the standard of  work performed by African laborers. 

The complaint of Africans, however, is not only that they are poor and the whites are  rich, but that the laws which are made by the whites are designed to preserve this  situation. There are two ways to break out of poverty. The first is by formal  education, and the second is by the worker acquiring a greater skill at his work and  thus higher wages. As far as Africans are concerned, both these avenues of  advancement are deliberately curtailed by legislation. 

The present Government has always sought to hamper Africans in their search for  education. One of their early acts, after coming into power, was to stop subsidies for  African school feeding. Many African children who attended schools depended on this  supplement to their diet. This was a cruel act. 

There is compulsory education for all white children at virtually no cost to their  parents, be they rich or poor. Similar facilities are not provided for the African  children, though there are some who receive such assistance. African children, however, generally have to pay more for their schooling than whites. According to  figures quoted by the South African Institute of Race Relations in its 1963 journal,  approximately 40 per cent of African children in the age group between seven to  fourteen do not attend school. For those who do attend school, the standards are  vastly different from those afforded to white children. In 1960-61 the per capita  Government spending on African students at State-aided schools was estimated at  R12.46. In the same years, the per capita spending on white children in the Cape  Province (which are the only figures available to me) was R144.57. Although there  are no figures available to me, it can be stated, without doubt, that the white  children on whom R144.57 per head was being spent all came from wealthier homes  than African children on whom R12.46 per head was being spent. 

The quality of education is also different. According to the Bantu Educational Journal,  only 5,660 African children in the whole of South Africa passed their Junior  Certificate in 1962, and in that year only 362 passed matric. This is presumably consistent with the policy of Bantu education about which the present Prime Minister  said, during the debate on the Bantu Education Bill in 1953: 

"When I have control of Native education I will reform it so that Natives will be  taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them . . .  People who believe in equality are not desirable teachers for Natives. When my  Department controls Native education it will know for what class of higher education  a Native is fitted, and whether he will have a chance in life to use his knowledge." 

The other main obstacle to the economic advancement of the African is the industrial  color-bar under which all the better jobs of industry are reserved for Whites only.  Moreover, Africans who do obtain employment in the unskilled and semi-skilled  occupations which are open to them are not allowed to form trade unions which have  recognition under the Industrial Conciliation Act. This means that strikes of African  workers are illegal, and that they are denied the right of collective bargaining which  is permitted to the better-paid White workers. The discrimination in the policy of  successive South African Governments towards African workers is demonstrated by  the so-called 'civilized labor policy' under which sheltered, unskilled Government jobs  are found for those white workers who cannot make the grade in industry, at wages  which far exceed the earnings of the average African employee in industry. 

The Government often answers its critics by saying that Africans in South Africa are  economically better off than the inhabitants of the other countries in Africa. I do not  know whether this statement is true and doubt whether any comparison can be  made without having regard to the cost-of-living index in such countries. But even if  it is true, as far as the African people are concerned it is irrelevant. Our complaint is  not that we are poor by comparison with people in other countries, but that we are  poor by comparison with the white people in our own country, and that we are  prevented by legislation from altering this imbalance. 

The lack of human dignity experienced by Africans is the direct result of the policy of  white supremacy. White supremacy implies black inferiority. Legislation designed to  preserve white supremacy entrenches this notion. Menial tasks in South Africa are  invariably performed by Africans. When anything has to be carried or cleaned the  white man will look around for an African to do it for him, whether the African is  employed by him or not. Because of this sort of attitude, whites tend to regard  Africans as a separate breed. They do not look upon them as people with families of  their own; they do not realize that they have emotions - that they fall in love like  white people do; that they want to be with their wives and children like white people  want to be with theirs; that they want to earn enough money to support their  families properly, to feed and clothe them and send them to school. And what  'house-boy' or 'garden-boy' or laborer can ever hope to do this? 

Pass laws, which to the Africans are among the most hated bits of legislation in  South Africa, render any African liable to police surveillance at any time. I doubt  whether there is a single African male in South Africa who has not at some stage had  a brush with the police over his pass. Hundreds and thousands of Africans are  thrown into jail each year under pass laws. Even worse than this is the fact that pass  laws keep husband and wife apart and lead to the breakdown of family life. 

Poverty and the breakdown of family life have secondary effects. Children wander  about the streets of the townships because they have no schools to go to, or no money to enable them to go to school, or no parents at home to see that they go to  school, because both parents (if there be two) have to work to keep the family alive.  This leads to a breakdown in moral standards, to an alarming rise in illegitimacy, and  to growing violence which erupts not only politically, but everywhere. Life in the  townships is dangerous. There is not a day that goes by without somebody being  stabbed or assaulted. And violence is carried out of the townships in the white living  areas. People are afraid to walk alone in the streets after dark. Housebreakings and  robberies are increasing, despite the fact that the death sentence can now be  imposed for such offences. Death sentences cannot cure the festering sore. 

Africans want to be paid a living wage. Africans want to perform work which they are  capable of doing, and not work which the Government declares them to be capable  of. Africans want to be allowed to live where they obtain work, and not be endorsed  out of an area because they were not born there. Africans want to be allowed to own  land in places where they work, and not to be obliged to live in rented houses which  they can never call their own. Africans want to be part of the general population, and  not confined to living in their own ghettoes. African men want to have their wives  and children to live with them where they work, and not be forced into an unnatural  existence in men's hostels. African women want to be with their menfolk and not be  left permanently widowed in the Reserves. Africans want to be allowed out after  eleven o'clock at night and not to be confined to their rooms like little children.  Africans want to be allowed to travel in their own country and to seek work where  they want to and not where the Labor Bureau tells them to. Africans want a just  share in the whole of South Africa; they want security and a stake in society. 

Above all, we want equal political rights, because without them our disabilities will be  permanent. I know this sounds revolutionary to the whites in this country, because  the majority of voters will be Africans. This makes the white man fear democracy. 

But this fear cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the only solution which will  guarantee racial harmony and freedom for all. It is not true that the enfranchisement  of all will result in racial domination. Political division, based on color, is entirely  artificial and, when it disappears, so will the domination of one color group by  another. The ANC has spent half a century fighting against racialism. When it  triumphs it will not change that policy. 

This then is what the ANC is fighting. Their struggle is a truly national one. It is a  struggle of the African people, inspired by their own suffering and their own  experience. It is a struggle for the right to live. 

During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I  have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I  have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live  together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live  for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.